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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study human cooperative behaviour on a varying set of
social games. Real data are analysed regarding persistent, mimetic and reciprocal strategies. Results
assert that players did not act rationally but were affected by their immediate memory. In particular
individual history rather than the environment has a significant influence on decision-making. Our
findings suggest that human cooperation may emerge as a built-in trait.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of cooperation is one of the most power-
ful ideas of interdisciplinary research. From ant’s social
life [1] to self-organization of crystals [2], cooperative phe-
nomena can be observed in almost any situation involving
collective actions. Hence our struggle to understand na-
ture demands nowadays a wider knowledge of the manner
in which cooperation emerges.
Cooperation is not a new concept in physics, though.
Thermodynamics has widely studied how in some phase
transitions correlations between individual agents are so
intense that the whole system behaves as one. Theories
such as the Ising model can be understood in cooperative
terms as well, where the particles can choose whether
to cooperate (parallel spins) or defect (opposite spins)
on the basis of a certain exchange potential. On the
whole, any subject aiming to analyse how macroscopic
phenomena arise from microscopic interactions will be
eventually related to this idea.
The newly born interest in modelling systems that ex-
hibit this sort of behaviour has extended tools and con-
cepts traditionally belonging to physics to other fields
such as biology, economy or sociology. Although contexts
may be strikingly divergent, the methodology involved
remains nearly the same. They all may require working
with a big amount of variables, incomplete information
on the way subjects interact or facing a significant reduc-
tion of the degrees of freedom.
This kind of interdisciplinar thinking is risky but pro-
lific. Computing science, bioengineering or biophysics are
some examples of promising research born in between dif-
ferent disciplines. Lately, some of these topics have been
gathered together under the name of Complex Systems,
a new area of knowledge which is rapidly gaining follow-
ers as well as scientific recognition. Game theory and so
a big part of the notions we deal with on this text form
part of this field.
Finally, comprehending human mind is undoubtedly
a complex problem where many factors may be inter-
linked, requiring a delicate treatment. Sociophysics or
neurophysics are some of the most recent attempts to
approach this question from a physical point of view.
With the research presented in this paper we aim to pro-
vide a deeper insight into how people cooperate through
analysing their decisions when playing social games.
II. GAME THEORY
Game theory is one of the first serious endeavours to
prescribe human behaviour through mathematical mod-
els. Although it was not fully applied to other sciences
until 1970, its origins date back to 1928 when Jon Von
Neumann published and article on how to best act when
playing parlour games, namely poker [3]. The basic ele-
ments of his theory are hence the following: players (any
subject making choices), decisions (called strategies) and
payoffs (the result or consequence to a certain action, in
general previously known by the players).
Despite game theory has evolved a great deal since
1928, its essential spirit is still the same. What makes
poker peculiar against other broadly studied games like
chess is that not all the information is available. Since
other people’s cards are carefully concealed, a unique log-
ical answer cannot be achieved and thus participants feel
obliged to behave strategically. This gives rise to a rich
scenario where concepts such as cooperation come into
scene. In special, we are concerned about games mod-
elling social dilemmas.
A. Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas are situations where individual inter-
ests are in conflict with the common good. In these games
each player must make their decision alone (C or D)
while ignoring the partner’s choice, yet the eventual out-
come depends on the global action as shown in Table I.
Orthodox game theory expects people to behave ratio-
nally, that is to pursue uniquely their own profit [4]. In
these terms, a dominant strategy is the one which max-
imizes the individual payoff. Nash equilibria is said to
be achieved when all players behave rationally. Instead,
Pareto’s optimality accounts for commonweal, such that
for any other set of strategies al least one player would
do worse [5]. The presumable disagreement between the
two equilibria is what gives rise to the dilemma.
Depending on the payoffs R, S, T and P players will
be more predisposed to cooperate or rather tempted to
defect (see Table I). For example, in Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD, T >R >P >S) rational players are supposed to
defect whereas Pareto’s optimality appears when they
both cooperate. In a Harmony Game (H, R >S >P
and R >T >P ) Nash and Pareto’s equilibria coincide
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and consequently cooperating is not only dominant but
also a profitable strategy. In other games no dominant
strategy exists. In particular in Stug Hunt (SH, R >T
>P >S), also known as a coordination game, actors tend
to cooperate or to defect simultaneiously. Similarly for
Snow Drift (SD, T >R >S >P ) players are expected to
betray each other resulting in an anti-coordination game.
XXXXXXXXXPlayer 1
Player 2
Cooperates Defects
Cooperates (R,R) (S,T)
Defects (T,S) (P,P)
TABLE I: Example of the usual matrix payoff for a
symmetric non-zero sum game.
These four dilemmas are believed to be specially rep-
resentative of any possible game. However, the expected
behaviour does not necessarily have to match the actual
behaviour. Testing this correspondence is crucial as long
as game theory aims to deepen into reality and not stand
as a mere entelechy. In the end, answering this question
requires to analyse real data about social interaction.
B. DAU experiment set up
In this paper we examine the empirical information ob-
tained from DAU experiment performed in Barcelona on
2014 [6]. Players faced a similar matrix to that repre-
sented in Table I with R = 10, P = 5, 4 <T <16 and -1
<S <11 [7].
Players had to decide between two actions (C or D)
for a certain number of rounds. Payoffs changed ran-
domly as well as their opponent so that adaptive pro-
cesses were maximally reduced. Participants would learn
the final outcome at the end of each game, but the ac-
cumulated gain was not displayed in the screen. Neither
it was the global ranking in order to avoid establishing a
super game.
Results show a relevant deviation from the behaviour
prescribed by orthodox rationalists, as can be observed
in Fig. 1 and Table II. As some authors state [8], ratio-
nal theory has proven to be incomplete or at least insuffi-
cient to account for the richness and diversity in decision-
making, with fundamental queries still to be solved.
Several sophisticated expansions of traditional game
theory have tried to provide plausible explanations to
this fundamental disparity. Bounded rationality, evolu-
tionary game theory or prospect theory are some exam-
ples of such kind of attempts. In light of some of their
contributions we evaluate the data obtained in the DAU
experiment, eventually aiming to fill the gap encountered
between rational prescriptions and empirical results.
FIG. 1: Expected (left) and experimental (right) results
on cooperative behaviour. The four games can be
recognised as different areas of the plane: PD
(bottom-right), H (upper-left), SH (bottom-left) and
SD (upper-right). Cooperation emerges unexpectedly in
PD while a notable increase of defectors appears for the
coordination and anticoordination situations. In the H
game cooperation rises for S >4 and T <10, because for
such payoffs cooperating leads unvaryingly to the
optimal outcome. In conclusion, although general
tendencies are accomplished, dominant strategies are
significantly different to the empirical data.
GAME % of CC actions % of CD/DC actions % of DD actions
PD 9,45 37,15 53,40
H 61,57 31,24 7,19
SH 19,65 48,18 32,17
SD 16,85 44,83 38,32
TABLE II: Empirical percentage of each action over the
total number of games. In the experiment 541
participants took part, thus resulting in a total number
of actions of 8366. Data asserts that Nash equilibrium
is not strictly fulfilled in any game, although general
tendencies are as prescribed.
III. LIMITS OF RATIONAL THEORY
In our analysis we focus on those changing factors that
may affect decision-making without being directly related
to the matrix payoff. In short, we study the relationship
between the previous scenario and the present selection
by examining the influence of the own prior choice (per-
sistence), of the opponent’s choice (mimesis) and finally
of the total choice (reciprocity). These three effects rep-
resent the player’s social memory in terms of own history
and environment.
It is noticeable that no relevance is given to the game
in which the prior action takes place. Hence we consider
the decision (C or D) itself. This assumption is justified
by the fact that payoffs are continuously changing, so the
impact of the matrix into the cooperation’s importance
is averaged over the (ST)-plane and therefore somewhat
suppressed. In this sense, we consider that individuals
are subject to volatile social conditions.
This investigation intends to reveal concealed mech-
anisms in decision-making that are beyond the limits
of rationality. We believe that such strategies are inti-
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mately bounded to the emergence of cooperation in real
life. Furthermore, this sort of ephemeral environments
can be conceived as a more genuine representation of so-
cial interaction, when the meaningfulness of the matrix
payoffs are not only diluted but also distorted by former
experience.
A. Persistence
In this section we examine whether there is a connec-
tion between current and previous decisions of the same
player. We present data as a S − T function since this
value is the maximum payoff difference in a symmetric
matrix, thus being representative of each game. Results
suggest that such correlation exists and is in fact signifi-
cant. As shown in Fig. 2 a certain inertia is displayed so
that players tend to persist in their strategies at least for
two rounds.
This could be accounted by a several number of hy-
pothesis such as the manifestation of transitory states of
mind (like euphoria or disappointment) or the existence
of a certain degree of automatization in decision-making
(namely a scarcity of conscious reflection).
Indeed, bounded rationality postulates that purely ra-
tional thinking is sometimes substituted by a set of al-
ternative strategies, that might be gathered into the fol-
lowing: trial and error, imitation, obeying an authority
or tradition, habit, thoughtless impulse and hunch [9].
In particular, it has been proved [10] that humans tend
to follow made-up rules that, though not completely re-
liable, speed up decision-making and function well for a
sufficient number of times. Some authors [8] propose as
an example the association stay–win change–lose, which
perfectly elucidates here the obtained results. On these
terms, persistence could be understood as a sort of prim-
itive criteria that imposes when no better reasoning is
attained, as an efficient strategy or plainly as a sponta-
neous first reaction.
B. Mimesis
We now evaluate whether the partner’s decision has an
impact on the player’s behaviour. It could be imagined
that tendencies such as copying the opponent’s strategy
may be significant.
Nevertheless, results decline mimesis as a determining
strategy, as can be concluded from Fig. 3. It has been
claimed that imitation arises as a need for economising
decision-making resources [11]. This mechanism is tech-
nically similar to that described to depict persistence, de-
spite the opposite implications on the final choice. There-
fore it is remarkable that both strategies do not emerge
symmetrically but instead persistence dominates (see Ta-
ble III). In conclusion, this finding suggests that the ac-
tual processes encouraging persistence and mimesis may
not be equivalent.
C. Reciprocity
It is a plausible assumption that players will not only
be affected by their own choice (persistence) or their op-
ponent’s decision (mimesis) but also by the entire action.
Although game’s design is conceived as to avoid adapta-
tion, fleeting responses are still to be expected.
Results demonstrate a decisive impact of the prior oc-
currence into the present game, as can be concluded from
Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. However, we can not disregard
the fact that persistent tendencies manifest as well, mak-
ing it difficult to distinguish between the two contribu-
tions (see Table III). That’s why we place a particular
attention on those bias which can not be acknowledged
FIG. 2: Persistent behaviours. Data (in several colours)
shows that those who have cooperated in the previous
round exhibit a certain tendency to cooperate again,
whereas those who have defected tilt to defect again.
Both strategies are relevant when compared to the
average population. For S–T >0 (H triangle) the
system collapses and no discrepancy is observed
between the two groups.
FIG. 3: Analysis of mimesis. Although a slight bias
may be noticed, data (in several colours) indicates that
mimesis can not be asserted as a meaningful effect.
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by persistent behaviours (for instance the drop on coop-
eration by deceived cooperators in the H game).
Evolutionary game theory claims that in social inter-
action humans experience a natural tendency to reward
generosity as well as to punish opportunism [12]. This
statement clarifies the observed reactions after successful
cooperation, but fails to explain the fact that deceived
cooperators choose to cooperate again. In addition, for
reciprocity to become a stable strategy, we would need
to establish a mechanism to recognise cooperators and
defectors in advance.
Other models incorporating the influence of feelings
can shed some light on the question. It has been sug-
gested [13] that emotional reactions interfere into cog-
nitive evaluation causing a distortion in the perception
of the payoffs. Thus, responses like thankfulness or vin-
dictiveness may profoundly affect the player’s decision.
In consequence, tendencies after consensus could be en-
couraged by reward and apathy while cheated players’
behaviour in H game might have been motivated by re-
venge. All in all, former’s cooperative perseverance in
the rest of the games as well as cheater’s insistence on
defecting are better explained by persistence.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Results demonstrate that memory plays an essential
role in decision-making for people facing a changing set
of games under varying social conditions. Participants on
the experiment have been found to display two significant
strategies: persistence and reciprocity. Anyhow, some of
our latter results can only be interpreted by means of
FIG. 4: Reciprocal behaviours. All strategies are proved
to be significant when compared to the average
population. In general terms CC and CD seem to
encourage cooperation, while after DD and DC a trend
to defect again is manifested. It is remarkable that for
the H triangle CD actions lead to a dramatic decrease
in cooperation. It can not be stated which action is the
main contribution to each bias.
persistent behaviour.
Theories such as bounded rationality roughly account
for most of our findings. However, the fact that imitation
is not a significant factor and that persistence prevails as
a dominant strategy even when the opponent cheats sug-
gests that some intrinsic features of the players should
Average p(C)=48,2%±1,7%
Persistence p(Ci|Ci)=55,5% p(Ci|Di)=39,4%
Mimesis p(Ci|Cj)=49,0% p(Ci|Dj)=45,8%
Reciprocity p(Ci|CiCj)=55,4% p(Ci|CiDj)=55,0%
p(Ci|DiDj)=40,5% p(Ci|DiCj)=42,2%
TABLE III: Conditioned probabilities for the three
effects. The conditioning decision always refers to the
previous action. i and j stand for the players (i 6= j).
Those values differing from the average more than a
1,7% can be said to be significantly different with a
99,7% of confidence (see Appendix).
FIG. 5: Cooperation after consensus. Unproductive
coordination (DD, left) increases defection except for
the H triangle which is not found significant. For the
coordination and anti-coordination games only about
the 20 % of the players are cooperative. Successful
cooperation (CC, right) results in a rise of cooperative
actions (about half the population cooperates in the
weak PD). In this case cooperation conforms around the
40% of actions in the SD and SH. Error analysis in the
Appendix.
FIG. 6: Cooperation after frustration. Cheating (left)
decreases cooperation to a 20% in all games except for
the strong H. Surprisingly, being deceived (right)
stimulates cooperation for PD, SD and SH arriving to
around a 50% of cooperative actions. However, for the
H triangle about only the 80 % of the players cooperate,
which is an outstanding drop (see Appendix).
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be acknowledged. In this sense, the main phenomenolog-
ical conclusion is that participants played cooperatively
or defectively almost independently of the environment.
Therefore, although some outstanding reactions to being
deceived have been analysed, altogether people behaved
persistently.
In conclusion, cooperation can arise in social interac-
tion as a built-in trait. Hence, payoffs are not as decisive
as traditional game theory have stated. Nevertheless, if
this phenomenon emerges as depicted by bounded ratio-
nality or responds to the existence of a cooperative phe-
notype is something that must be investigated. Other de-
cisive questions may include analysing whether memory
stands for more than two rounds or if it can be modelled
in terms of a Markov Chain.
Eventually, this would lead us to further research. The
explanations provided up to now are known to be merely
descriptive and rather ad hoc, yet they arise from the
necessity to confront experimental results with the or-
thodox theory. Once data has provided us with suitable
hypothesis, the next step would be postulating a predic-
tive model. Similar processes have occurred in physics
before and led to exceptional results. In our case, the
complexity of the human mind should not be seen as
a discouraging obstacle but rather as an inspiring chal-
lenge.
V. APPENDIX: ERROR ANALYSIS
The error for a binomial process is calculated following
Eq.(1).
err = z
√
p(1− p)
N
(1)
For the S–T plots, errorbars are computed with z = 1 and
all strategies are compared to the behaviour of the aver-
age (whole population without the first round of players,
since they do not have memory yet). We consider data
to be relevant if its errorbars do not interfere with the
average’s ones. Significance for Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 is com-
puted dividing the discrepancy between the strategy and
the error of the average with z = 2, thus data can be
said to be significant with a 95,45% of confidence in al-
most all points. Finally, for Table III the error has been
calculated with with z = 3.
FIG. 7: Significance for consensus: successful
cooperators (left) and unproductive concorders (right).
FIG. 8: Significance for frustrated cooperation: cheaters
(left) and deceived players (right).
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